Source: business-case.md (full strategic business case)

What this source is

The comprehensive business case document — at ~16,500 chars it is the single largest source in the corpus and the most important business-strategy document. Version 4.1, dated April 9, 2026. Structured as a Squire leadership evaluation document with explicit framing: “All materials showcase technical achievements and business potential as a stand-alone assessment.”

This source is the origin of the $4.4M-$7.4M Year 3 ARR number that the elevator pitch references, the three-channel revenue model, the “Built for Ourselves First” strategy, and the $35M-$89M platform valuation claim. It also explicitly confirms that Squire runs SuiteCentral 1.0 across 40+ client environments and operates two separate practices (NetSuite and Business Central).

Key claims (new content beyond prior sources, grouped by section)

The transformation story

1. “Transform Squire from a NetSuite consulting firm into a multi-channel integration platform company” → squire
2. Two separate practices at Squire (NEW DETAIL): (a) NetSuite Practice (SuiteCentral 1.0 — NS-only, manual mapping, limited targets); (b) Business Central Practice (separate toolset, no AI, cannot leverage SuiteCentral). → squire
3. 2× operational overhead — two platforms to maintain, cannot cross-sell → squire
4. 225+ hours wasted annually per consultant on manual mapping → production-proof
5. SuiteCentral 1.0 already supports Squire delivery across 40+ client environments — formally ingested confirmation of the 40+ number previously known only from notebook queries → squire
6. Workato as a NEW competitor ($5.7B valuation, 500% growth in AI automations, GenAI platform May 2024, expanding to NS+BC markets) → competitive-landscape

Multi-channel revenue model (the financial core)

7. Three revenue channels (NEW):
   • Channel 1: Partner Licensing — $10K/yearperpartner.Year1:$50K-$100K\to Year3:$400K-$500K
   • Channel 2: Direct Sales (SaaS) — $2,495/month($29,940/year). Year 1: $150K-$300K → Year 3: $3M-$5M
   • Channel 3: Integration Enhancements — $995-$1,495/month. Launch Year 2 → Year 3: $1M-$2M
8. Total ARR trajectory: Year 1 $200K-$400K → Year 2 $1.4M-$2.2M → Year 3 $4.4M-$7.4M → Year 5 $21.5M+
9. TAM: 77K (37K NetSuite + 40K Business Central customers) → roi-scenarios or new market-size section
10. Year 3 financial projections: Gross margin 82%, EBITDA $1.15M-$3.61M, cumulative 3-year profit $610K-$3.86M
11. Platform valuation: 8-12× ARR = $35M-$89M by Year 3 → squire (the transformation thesis’s financial endgame)

LTV/CAC and payback (the CFO’s checklist)

12. LTV/CAC ratios: Partners 13.3×, Direct 8.0×, Upgrades 12.0× (all excellent — >5× is generally considered strong)
13. Payback periods: Partners 3 months, Direct 6 months, Upgrades 4 months
14. Customer tenure assumptions: Partners 4 years, Direct 4 years, Upgrades 5 years

Phased investment plan

15. Phase 1 (months 1-6): $0 incremental — use existing Squire team. Internal validation. 5-10 pilot workflows.
16. Phase 2 (months 7-12): +3.5 FTE = ~$430Kpayroll+$75K tech = $505K Year 1 investment. Dual-channel launch.
17. Phase 3 (Year 2-3): +6 FTE Year 2 (~$800K)++9FTEYear3($1.15M) = $2.455M cumulative 3-year investment.
18. Decision framework with explicit YES/NO criteria:
    • YES if: willing to use internally first, commit 10-15 client projects, comfortable with Year 1 investment phase ($505K), believe in multi-channel GTM, want platform transformation
    • NO if: want immediate revenue, unwilling to use internally, can’t commit resources, prefer staying pure consulting, uncomfortable with AI technology risk

”Built for Ourselves First” as a de-risking strategy

19. The de-risked approach (vs traditional startup): use SuiteCentral 2.0 internally first → prove ROI → launch externally with real case studies → scale with confidence
20. Phase 1 internal ROI (months 1-6): 15 projects × 36 hours saved = 540 hours = $81Klaborsavings;support5\times moreclients=$200K+ opportunity cost
21. “The platform NetSuite consultants use themselves” as the go-to-market positioning tagline

Competitive framing

22. Updated external claims standard: “Competitive framing in this document avoids exclusivity claims about competitor MCP/AI availability and instead emphasizes governance depth, explainability, and dual-ERP execution.” — consistent with 26-canonical-metrics-and-wording style guide.
23. SuiteWorld 2026 as the specific event for Phase 2 partner launch (first formal mention of SuiteWorld as a go-to-market moment)

Immediate actions (next 30 days)

24. Four 30-day actions: (a) leadership decision on controlled SC 2.0 pilot sponsorship, (b) identify 10-15 upcoming client projects, (c) measure current deployment time and support ratios (baseline), (d) identify Phase 2 hires

Pages updated by this ingest

Created (1 new page):

• revenue-model — the three-channel revenue model with Year 1-3-5 ARR trajectory, LTV/CAC ratios, payback periods, phased investment plan, platform valuation

Updated (5 existing pages):

• squire — two-practice structure, 40+ client environments confirmed, $35M-$89M valuation target, “Built for Ourselves First” strategy, SuiteWorld 2026
• competitive-landscape — Workato as a new competitor
• roi-scenarios — cross-link to the three-channel revenue model
• pilot-30-60-90 — Phase 1 internal ROI numbers, the YES/NO decision criteria
• executive-reading-guide — may want to reference the revenue model section

Cross-references / contradictions

• “90%+ field mapping accuracy” vs canonical “95-99%”: business-case uses “90%+” which is a more conservative floor than the 95-99% verified in 04-technical-proof. Not contradictory — 90%+ is the floor guarantee; 95-99% is the measured performance. The business case is using the more conservative number, which is the right choice for a financial document.
• “40 hours per deployment” vs “15 hours per integration”: business-case says 40 hours per deployment; elevator pitch says 15 hours per integration. These are different metrics (deployment = end-to-end project including setup, mapping, testing, go-live; mapping = just the field-mapping step). Both can be correct simultaneously.
• Workato is NEW to the competitive landscape: not in 25-competitive-evidence-register. $5.7B valuation makes them the largest competitor by valuation. Should be added to the competitive landscape page.
• SuiteWorld 2026 is a real event (NetSuite’s annual conference). This is the first mention of a specific go-to-market date/event. Likely occurs in October/November 2026.
• $35M-$89M valuation uses 8-12× ARR multiplier. This is aggressive but within the SaaS valuation range for a growing platform with strong LTV/CAC ratios. It’s also the financial endgame that justifies Jonyce Bullock’s (CEO) “growth multiplier” and “recurring revenue potential” talking points from read-talking-points.

Notes

• This is clearly the primary pitch document for Squire leadership — it is the document that connects the technology case (SuiteCentral 2.0 is real and working) to the business case (here’s how it generates revenue and transforms the company). Every other document in the executive package supports this one.
• The “IMPORTANT NOTE” at the top is legally careful: “References to implementation and revenue should be understood as potential opportunities IF Squire chooses to adopt.” This frames the document as an evaluation, not a sales agreement.
• The YES/NO decision criteria (claim 18) are unusually honest — the NO column says “don’t proceed if you want immediate revenue” or “you’re uncomfortable with AI technology risk.” This sets proper expectations and is consistent with the “without overly selling” tone instruction.
• Version 4.1, dated April 9, 2026 — this is the freshest source in the entire corpus (2 days old as of the current session on April 11, 2026).